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INHERENT POWER OF THE JUDICIARY OVER
ADMITTANCE TO THE BAR
Admission to the bar is a matter of increasing concern to the
state. As its economic life, its social life, become more intricate,
the legal rules governing social conduct and their administration
through courts of justice become more complicated, so that adequately trained lawyers are increasingly necessary to the competent exercise of their function as officers of the courts admnistering justice. Too, overcrowding of the bar' increases the concern.
As the relative number of lawyers increases, the temptation to
lawyers to violate the public trust reposed in them increases, and
their violations of legal ethics work generally to the detriment of
society and specifically to the interference with administration of
justice and to the disgrace of their profession.
Higher standards for admission to the bar would result in a
more competently trained bar, and would relieve considerably the
overcrowded condition by admitting as lawyers, officers of the
court, only those well prepared to assist the courts in their work.
There is strong sentiment that favors (and justly so) democracy
of the bar. But surely the thinking adherents of that democracy
would favor a raising of standards directed to the benefit of the
general public and the profession. "The American Bar Association
believes in that democracy, but firmly maintains that it should not
2
be used as a cloak to excuse inadequate legal training."
Courts are well acquainted with the considerations that should
be determinative of standards for admission to the bar. As a practical matter they are best qualified to determine standards of admission. And, as a legal matter, the courts have inherent power
over admission to the bar. But, because many regulations of the
practice of law have been by legislation in the order of police regulations of individuals for the welfare of the general public, there
has arisen a popular misconception that admission is a matter
subject to legislative control.
This article is directed to pointing out, both generally and in
Washington, the inherent power of the judiciary over admission
to the bar.3 It is proper to look to the courts for a necessary rais"During the last decade the numbers in our (legal) profession have
increased by a third, which is twice the percentage of increase of the
population during the same period, and five times that of the doctors."
Notes on Legal Education, published by the Section of Legal Education
and Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Association, June 25, 1932.
"Notes
on Legal Education, ibid.
Although the subject of this article is limited to the power of the
courts over admission to the bar, since the courts generally consider power
over admission to the bar and power over discipline of its members as
correlative parts of the same inherent power, reference is made to some
disbarment cases in which there is consideration of the general problem.
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ing of standards of admission. It is constitutional for the courts
to raise those standards.
IN ENGLAND PmOR TO

1776

Prior to the Revolution of 1776 admission to the bar in England
was governed by the courts through their deputies, the Inns of
Court. This power of the courts over admission, in its inception,
seems to have come by grant of authority from the sovereign, with
statutory confirmation. 4 Bolland writing on the problem, "how
and when did the Courts begin to recognize the qualifications of a
Barrister of the Inn to practice before them'" concludes
"The conclusion, then, at which I arrive is this. that
authority to call to the Bar was granted by Edward I,
with statutory confirmation, to the Judges exclusively,
and that the Judges have constituted the Benchers of the
Inns of Court their deputies for this purpose. The
Benchers call to the Bars of their respective Inns, and
the Judges receive at the Bar of the Court without further form or ceremony those whom the Benchers, as their
authorized deputies, have called." 5
Notwithstanding the origin of the courts' powers over those practicing before them, it is well recognized that "although the profession had its origin and mature development in a country where
constitutional divisions of government were unknown, its supervision and control at every stage were handed over to the judges,
until by long continued use they came to constitute recognized prerogatives belonging to the judiciary "6 And though Parliament
from time to time passed statutes regulating admission to the bar, 7
they were of negative character denying admission to those unworthy
Many cases in the United States, in interpreting the English
situation, reach conclusions the same as those above. Among the
more prominent of these decisions are In re Day," In re Cate,9
'20 Edw. I (1292), 1 Rot. Parl. 84, Holdswortk's History of English
Law, Vol. 2, pp. 311-318, 484-512; 1 Pollack and Maitland, History of Englisb Law, p. 190, et seq., Bolland: "Two Problems m Legal History," 24
Law Q. Rev. 392; Bruce, "The Judicial Prerogative and Admission to the
Bar," 19 Ill. Law Rev. 1.
24 Law Q. R. 392, 397.
'Leon Green: "The Courts' Power over Admission and Disbarment,"
4 Tex. Law Rev. 1, 2 Halsbury's Laws of Eng., p. 360.
'Maugham on Attorneys, 15-20, App. xiv-xx.
8 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646, 50 L. R. A. 519 (1899).
' 270 Pac. 968 (Cal. 1928).
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In re O'Brsen's Petitwn,0 State v. Cannon," and In re Optntwn
12
of the Justices to the Senate.
IN THE UNITED STATES

In the United States it has, with but few exceptions, been held
that courts have inherent power over admission to the bar.
The federal courts have always recognized that the judiciary
3
has such control (over admission to the bar) In ex parte Secombe'
Chief Justice Taney stated. "It has been well settled, by the rules
and practice of common law courts, that it rests exclusively with
the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers,
as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be
removed." ' 14 In Ex parte Garland5 the Supreme Court of the

United States held the test oath prescribed by the Act of Congress
of January 24, 1865, unconstitutional because the statute was a
bill of attainder and ex post facto. But the eourt's statement regarding the nature of the function of admitting to the bar has
so frequently been quoted and relied upon as sound authority
that it is set out here m part.
"They (attorneys and counselors) are officers of the
court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of
their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private
character. ** * The order of admission is the judgment
of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors and are entitled to
appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry
the parties become officers of the court and are responsible
to it for professional misconduct. * - ' Their admission
or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial
power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been
so held in numerous cases. "16
This inherent power of the courts has been generally recognized in
the various state jurisdictions. "
'O79 Conn. 46, 63 Atl. 777 (1906)
"240 N. W 441 (Wis. 1932) Here the court made an "original and
fundamental investigation of the question" (legislative and judicial power
over admission to the bar) and after its exhaustive review of history and
case law came to the same conclusions set forth above.
"2180 N. E. 725 (Mass. 1932).
"319 How. 9, 15 L. ed. 565 (1857).
"Ibid.
4 Wall. 333, 18 L. ed. 366 (1867).
"Ibid,
378.
7
" Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 15 L. ed. 565 (1857) Wernsmont v.
State, 101 Ark. 210, 142 S. W 194 (1911) In re Chapele, 71 Cal. App.
129, 234 Pac. 906 (1925) In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646, 50 L. R. A.
519 (1899)
Hanson v. Grattan, 84 Kan. 843, 115 Pac. 646, 36 L. R. A.
(n. s.) 240 (1911) Re Branch, 70 N .J. L. 537, 57 Atl. 431 (1904) Splane's
Petition,123 Pa. 527, 16 Atl. 481 (1889) Hoopes v. Bradshaw, 231 Pa. 485,
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There have been no recent decisions in any of the jurisdictions
denying the existence of tins inherent power. And most of the few
cases holding contra to the majority followed the case of In re
Cooper,"8 a New York decision of uncertain authority In the case
of In re Applicants for L'_eense to Practice Laow9 the North Carolina Supreme Court stated.
"It is urged, however, that the statute impairs or destroys the inherent right of the court to direct and control
the conduct of attorneys who are its officers. There are
decisions which so express themselves on this question,
and, if by 'inherent' they intend to say-and this is all
that most of them do say-that, in the absence of legislation on the subject, the courts have the power to regulate
and deal with the matters mentioned, this may be accepted. But, if by 'inherent' is meant that the power, to
the extent claimed here, is one inherent because essential to
the existence of the court and the proper exercise of its
functions, we do not think the position can be maintained."'20
For authority to bolster up its position the court relied upon In re
Cooper 21 And in State v. Kirke2 2 the Florida court held, "At the
common law the courts had no power to admit attorneys or counselors and it has been held that for this reason tins is a power not
inherent m a court, and in the absence of constitutional provisions
a matter for regulation by the Legislative Department of the Government," 28 the court, here too, relying for authority on the Cooper
Case and its interpretation of the history of the English bar. But
this Cooper Case, relied upon for authority by these North Carolina and Florida decisions, has been criticized and definitely discredited. In the New York case the legislature of that state had
enacted a statute admitting to practice on diploma of the Columbia
College, and the Court of Appeals held that the statute was valid.
The appeal from the Supreme Court was entertained on the ground
that admission to the bar was a judicial proceeding and the exercise of an appropriate judicial function. But, as the New York case
24
was explained by the Ilinois court in In re Day,
80 AtI. 1098 (1911) In re Lambuth, 18 Wash. 478, 480, 51 Pac. 1071 (1898)
In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 1152 (1918) In re Application for
License to Practice Law, 67 W. Va. 213, 67 S. E. 597 (1910)
Vernon
County Bar Assoc. v. McKibben, 153 Wis. 350, 353, 141 N. W 283 (1913),
State v. Cannon, 240 N. W 441 (Wis. 1932) State Board of Law Rxamtners v. Phelan,5 Pac. (2d) 263 (Wyo. 1931) In re: Opsnion of the Justices
to the Senate, (2d), 180 N. E. 725 (Mass. 1932).
22 N. Y. 67 (1860).
10143 N. C. 1, 55 S. E. 635 (1906).
55 S. E. 635, 637.
Note 18, supra.
22
12 Fla. 278 (1868)
:aIbid, 281.
11181 I1. 73, 54 N. E. 646 (1899).
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"The court based its decision upon the ground that
although the appointment of attorneys had usually been
intrusted in that State to the courts, and was judicial in its
nature, yet it was not a necessary or inherent part of their
judicial power, but was subject to legislative action, and
had been derived from statute. In that State, the power
to admit to practice was exercised before the Revolution
by the Governor. By the Constitution of 1777 the appointment of attorneys was given to the courts, but the
provision was dropped from the Constitution of 1846,
which provided, 'Any male citizen of the age of twentyone years, of good moral character, and who possesses the
requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be
entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this
State.' In view of the history of admission and this particular condition of affairs, the act was sustained. The
consequences have been greatly deplored by eminent men
abundantly able to judge of the injustice to the public
resulting from the rule then established,
under which
25
other special laws were passed."
In a discussion of the power of the courts over admission, the
Cooper Case has been criticized as follows.26
"The elaborate brief of Professor Dwight in this case
contains much of the ancient learning on the subject, but
the brief is naturally not conceived in a judicial spirit, and
it is quite as interesting for what it omits as for what it
contains. The power of the judges to give a remedy to
a person properly qualified for the bar, who had been rejected by the Inns of Court is never mentioned, nor was
the attention of the court called to the fact that the earliest acts of Parliament upon the subject do not confer,
but restrict, the judge's power to admit. It was very unfortunate that the case was argued only on one side, and
when the court below found out what had happened in
the Court of Appeals, they protested against the way in
which a reversal of their judgment was obtained, without
notice to anyone. * 0 1"
"In justice to the New York court, it ought to be said
that very likely they construed the act as making the diploma not conclusive, but only competent, evidence. : ' '
If this is true-(the history of the constitutional provisious alluded to in the In re Day opinion quoted above)it seems fair to say that the common law discretion of the
judges in admitting to the bar, which exists under the
normal American constitution, did not exist in New
York. '2
Other criticisms of the Cooper Case to the same effect have been
"54 N. E. 646, 651.
"13 Harv. L. R. 231.
2Ibid,
253.

ADMITTANCE

TO THE BAR

made.28 And the New York case of People v. Culkin 9 decided in
1928, with an opinion by Chief Justice Cardoza, has clouded the
authority of the Cooper Case in New York.
In view of these generally accepted criticisms of the Cooper Case,
which go directly to the reliance on it made by the North Carolina
and Florida courts, it would seem that these North Carolina and
Florida decisions are erroneous. They seemingly stand alone,80
and certainly are entitled to but little weight against the strong
majority holding as to the courts' inherent power over admission
to the bar.
LEGISLATIVE REGULATION OF AND JUDICIAL POWER
OVER ADMISSION TO THE BAR

The courts having inherent power over admission to the bar, it
would seem logically tenable that any legislative regulation of the
same matter would be an encroachment upon the inherent power
of the judiciary, and therefore unconstitutional as violating the
division of powers, which is characteristic of the constitutional law
of most states. And such, in effect, is the holding of a small minority of the states. These few jurisdictions hold that the legislature
may not regulate admission to the bar in any manner, on the
ground that the courts have sole power over the matter, free from
interference by either of the other branches of the government., 1
In a great majority of the jurisdictions, however, there is permitted such legislative regulations as are proper exercises of the
police power and do not encroach upon the inherent power of the
court. As the Pennsylvania court recently stated:

28

"The true rule is as follows: Statutes dealing with admissions to the bar will be judicially recognized as valid
so far as but no further than the legislation involved does
not encroach on the right of the courts to say who shall
be privileged to practice before them and under what
"The Courts' Power over Admission and Disbarment," Leon Green,

4 Tex. Law Rev. 1, 9, 10; In re Cate, 270 Pac. 968, 982 (Cal. 1928); State
v. Cannon, 240 N. W. 441, 450 (Wis. 1932).
'9248 N. Y. 465, 162 N. E. 487, 492, 60 A. L. R. 851 (1928).
10In re Saddler, 35 Okla. 510, 130 Pac. 906 (1913) is seemingly contra,

however. There the court held, "that insofar as the statute here involved prohibits a disbarment for acts involving moral turpitude, but
disconnected with the professional or official duties of an attorney, until

after conviction therefor, is not violative of the provisions of the Constitution, vesting in various courts of the state judicial power and prohibiting
the exercise by one of the three departments of government of the power
properly belonging to the other departmnts." In re Eaton, 4 N. D. 514,
62 N. W. 597 (1895), is to the same effect.
8 The Illinois case of In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646, 50 L. R. A.
519 (1899), is the leading case of this group. Splane's Petition, 123 Pa.
527, 16 Atl. 481 (1889), and Re Branch, 70 N. J. L. 537, 57 Atl. 431 (1904),
are to the same effect. But Pennsylvania has since the Splane case
joined the majority holding-In re Olmsted, 292 Pa. 96, 140 Atl. 634 (1928).
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circumstances
persons shall be admitted to that priv82
ilege."
This limitation of the legislative power to enacting regulations
that do not encroach upon the courts' inherent power over adnission to practice, as stated by the courts in the various cases upholding such regulations, is not dictum, for those decisions generally proceed upon this line of reasoning The courts have inherent
power over admission to the bar, but as a matter of comity between the governmental departments and of administrative convenience such legislative regulation as does not encroach upon the
inherent power will be upheld, the statute in question is a proper
exercise of police power and does not encroach upon the courts'
inherent power, therefore the statute is constitutional, of full force
and effect.
The California court in Re Chapelle88 denied the application of
Chapelle for admission to the bar without examination, as required
by statute. The court stated
"The courts undoubtedly enjoy the inherent power to
determine what persons shall be admitted to the bar (6
C. J 571) * 1 -: Notwithstanding the inherent power of
the courts to admit applicants for licenses to practice
law, 'it has been generally conceded that the Legislature
may, in the exercise of the police power, prescribe reasonable rules and regulations for admission to the bar
which will be followed by the courts.' 6 C. J 572. Vernon
Co. Bar Ass'n. v. McKibben, 153 Wis. 350, 141 N. W 283,
In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 P 1152, Keeley v. Evans
(D C.) 271 F 520, In re Ellis, 118 Wash. 484, 203 P 957
"The only restraintsupon the exercise of this power by
the Legislature are that the regulations prescribed by that
branch of the government shall be reasonable and shall
not deprive the judicial branch of its power to prescribe
additional conditions under which applications shall be
admitted, nor take from the courts the right and duty of
actually making orders admitting them. 6 C. J 572, In
re Platz, 42 Utah 439, 132 P 390.''1 4 (Italics inserted.)
In Brydonjack v. State Bar8 the California Supreme Court,
sitting en bane, considered the petitioner's application for admission to the California bar, and in the course of its opinion stated
"The sum total of this matter (legislative regulation) is that the
Legislature may put reasonable restrictions upon constitutional
SIn re Olmstec, 292 Pa. 96, 140 Atl. 634, 636 (1928).

v. Cannon, 240 N. W 441 (Wis. 1932)

See also:

State

In re: Opsmon of the Justices to

the Senate, 180 N. E. 725 (Mass. 1932)
p. 728.
71 Cal. A. 129, 234 Pac. 906 (1925).
"234 Pac. 906, 907.
2 208 Cal. 439, 281 Pac. 1018 (1929)

and cases collected therein at
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functions of the courts provided they do not defeat or materially
impair the exercise of those functions.""
In the recent Opirnon of the Justices to the Senate 7 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts declared.
"No statute can control the judicial department in the
performance of its duty to decide who shall enjoy the privilege of practicing law e * * Statutes respecting adnssions to the bar, winch afford appropriate instrumentalities for the ascertamment of qualifications of applicants,
are no encroachment on the judicial department. * * *
Statutes of that nature are valid provided they do not infringe on the right of the judicial department to determine who shall exercise the privilege of practicing in the
courts and under what circumstances and with what qualifications persons shall be admitted to that end. When
and so far as statutes specify qualificatsons and. accomplishments, they will be regarded as fixing the minmum
and not as setting bounds beyond whwh the judiczai department cannot go. Such specifications will be regarded
as limitations, not upon the judical department, but upon
individuals seekng admssion to the bar. There is no
power in the General Court to compel the judicial department to admit as attorneys those deemed by it to be unfit
to exercise the prerogatives and to perform the duties of
an attorney at law. * * *
"These conclusions are in accord with the principles declared in substance by the great majority of courts in this
country, many decisions of wnch are collected in a footnote." 88 (Italics inserted.)
Upon recognition of tins rule it follows as a matter of course
that legislative regulations encroaching on the courts' inherent
power over admission (and disbarment) are unconstitutional, and
that, notwithstanding or independent of statutory provisions, the
courts, in the exercise of their inherent power, may disregard the
legislative regulations and apply their own winch may be in delimitation or addition to the legislature's.
In 1931 the New Mexico court while upholding the State Bar
Act as an exercise of police power, in a proceeding under the act
to suspend an attorney for non-payment of dues required by law
of practicing attorneys, rejected one part of it. "The power to suspend or disbar an attorney, being a strictly judicial function, may
not be performed by the Board of Commissioners of the State Bar,
281 Pac. 1018, 1020.
31180 N. E. 725 (Mass. 1932).
3 Ibid, 727. In accord: Hanson v. Grattan, 84 Kan. 843, 115 Pac. 646,
34 L. R. A. (n. s.) 240 (1911) Re Crum, 103 Ore. 296, 204 Pac. 948 (1922)
Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 1152 (1918) Re Adkzns, 83 W Va. 673,
98 S. E. 888 (1919) State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 221 N. W 603 (1928)
State Board of Law Examsners v. Phelan, 5 Pac. (2d) 263 (Wyo. 1931).

/
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and the provisions of the State Bar Act purporting to confer
such authority on the board are void as violating section 1 of article
3 of the Constitution making a departmental division of powers
into legislative, judicial and executive.' "9
In the 1932 case of State v. Cannon0 the Wisconsin court held
invalid a legislative act reinstating Mr. Cannon as an attorney at
law One of the reasons given by the court for invalidating the
statute was that it encroached upon the inherent power of the
court, the freedom of this power from legislative limitation was
declared in the court's opinion
"While the Legislature may legislate with respect to
the qualifications of attorneys, its power in that respect
does not rest upon any power possessed by it to deal exclusively with the subject of the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect the public interest. * 0 - Such
legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate
qualificatwns beyond which the court cannot go in fixing
additional qualifications deemed necessary by the courts
for the proper administrationof judicial functwns. There
is no legislative power to compel courts to admit to their
bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law The power of the court in this
respect is limited only to the class which the Legislature
has determined is necessary to conserve the public welfare."'" (Italics inserted.)
In the Brydonjack Case42 the California court refused to follow
the findings of the Commission of Bar Examiners of the State
Bar. Petitioner had been refused a recommendation for admission by the board, and he took a writ of review to the California
Supreme Court. The court treated his petition as a written motion
for an order of admission, and granted the motion
"Our conclusion, then, is that the Legislature in its
wisdom has placed at the disposal of this court a competent and effective body to aid it in the important function
of admissions to the bar. The applicants are to first submit themselves to this bureau for investigation, and after
this is done the power in this court ws plenary to admit
those who have in our opinion met the prescribed test,
whether the investigators do or do not agree with this conclusion."' 4 (Italics inserted.)
In several recent cases the courts have exercised their power,
391n re Gibson, 4 Pac. (2d) 643 (N. M. 1931).
Edwards, 45 Ida. 676, 266 Pac. 665 (1928).
10 240 N. W 441.
11Ibid, 450.
42 208 Cal. 439, 281 Pac. 1018 (1929).
"1281 Pac. 1018, 1021.

In accord:

In

re
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matters involving admission or disbarment, to decide in accordance with their own rules, notwithstanding legislative regulation.
In 1928 the Pennsylvania court took such action in In re Olinsted.44 Ol m sted had sought admission to the Delaware County bar
without complying with a court rule providing that an applicant
for admission to the bar of Delaware County should make a "formal declaration in -writing that he intends permanently to practice
in that county, and within three months to open his principal office
there, winch certificate shall be filed by the board (of bar examiners) with its report." The board had refused the certificate on
the sole ground that this rule had not been complied with. Stating
the rule that, "Statutes dealing with admissions to the bar will be
judicially recognized as valid so far as but no further than the
legislation involved does not encroach on the right of the court to
say who shall be privileged to practice before them and under
what circumstances persons shall be admitted to that privilege," 4 5
the court discharged the rule to show cause why petitioner should
not be enrolled as a member of the Delaware County bar. And by
statutes generally governing the situation, petitioner would have
been entitled to be enrolled, only non-compliance with the additional court rule stood in the way
In 1926 the Arizona Supreme Court acted upon an original proceeding before it on petition of the attorney general for the disbarment of one Bailey for reasons other than those prescribed by the
legislature. Demurrer was overruled, with leave to answer, the
court statingin

"The Legislature may, and very properly does, provide
from time to time that certain minimum qualifications
shall be possessed by every citizen who desires to apply to
the courts for permission to practice therein, and the
courts will require all applicants to comply with the statute. This, however, its a limitation, not on the courts, but
upon the individual citizen, and it -n no manner can be
construed as compelling the courts to accept as thetr officers all applicantswho have passed such minzmum standards, unless the courts are themselves satisfied that such
qualifications are sufficient. If they are not, it is their
inherent right to prescribe such other and additional conditions as may be necessary to satisfy them the applicants
are indeed entitled to become such officers. * * *
"Such being the law in regard to admission to the bar,
it equally and necessarily follows that, whenever a practitioner by ins conduct shows that he no longer possesses
the qualifications required for ins admission, he may be
"292 Pa. 96, 140 At. 634.
-140 AtI. 634, 636.
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deprived of the privilege theretofore granted him, and such
deprivation may be either under the authority of a statute
prescribing the cause therefor, and the manner of pro'4
cedure, or.the court of its own nherent power may act.'
(Italics inserted.)
The Appellate Division in New York has declared that the court's
judgment as to fitness of applicants for admission cannot be precluded by the boards created by the legislature. "Admission to
the bar is a privilege, and not a right, and the action of the bar
examiners, in admitting applicant to examination and in certifying to applicant's knowledge of our laws, cannot preclude tins
court from the exercise of its judgment as to applicant's general character and fitness."'a And the court, acting in the exercise
of its own inherent power, refused admission to petitioner on the
ground that in the opinion of the court his general character unfitted him for the position he sought.
In Freeling v. Tucker48 plaintiff, an Oklahoma attorney, had
rendered services in Idaho for defendant. And when plaintiff sued
for the amount due for services defendant urged in defense that
since plaintiff was not admitted to practice in Idaho he could not
recover for services as an attorney rendered in that state. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed, the court holding "The power
of the Legislature to provide the manner, terms, and conditions of
the admission of attorneys to practice, does not deprive the courts
of their inherent power, as a matter of comity, to permit an attorney from a sister state to appear and present argument in a particular case. "'
From examination of these cases it is clear that by great weight
of authority the judiciary has inherent power over admission to
the bar and discipline of its members, that while the legislature
has police power to establish reasonable qualifications for admission
and to make reasonable regulations of attorneys which do not encroach upon the inherent power of the judiciary, those qualifications or regulations which are encroachments upon the judiciary's
power are unconstitutional, and that the judiciary in the exercise
of its inherent power may act independent of or notwithstanding
legislative regulations. And examination of the Washington cases
shows the decisions of this state's Supreme Court to be in accord
with the great weight of authority
" In re Bailey, 30 Ariz. 407, 248 Pac. 29, 30 (1926)
"ITIn re Peters, 221 App. Div. 607, 225 N. Y. S. 144 (1927)
effect; In re Platz, 42 Utah 439, 132 Pac. 390 (1913).
4849 Ida. 475, 289 Pac. 85 (1930).
11289 Pac. 85, 86.

To same
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THM STATE OF WASINGTON

The Washington court at an early date recognized attorneys as
officers of the court. In Presby v. Klickitat County 0 the court
held. "An attorney is an officer of the court, and he takes his
office with all its burdens as well as all its rights and privileges.
And among the burdens thus assumed is that of being obliged,
when requested by the court, to conduct, without compensation,
the defense of those who are destitute of means, and are accused
of crime." 51
The inherent power of the Washington court to control disci52
pline of members of the bar was established in In re Lambuth
where in disbarment proceedings the court stated.
"Attorneys and counselors at law are officers of the
court. '* -*
"But power,to strike from the rolls is inherent in the
court itself No statute or rule is necessary to authorize
the punishment in proper cases. Statutes and rules may
regulate the power, but they do not create it. It is necessary for the protection of the court, the proper administration of justice, the dignity and purity of the profession, and for the public good and the protection of
clients." 58 (Italics inserted.)
Although the inherent power of the court was seemingly clouded by the opinion in the disbarment case, In re Waugh,54 the later
cases of In re Roblnson55 and In re Bruen58 cleared the power of
any such cloudiness by discrediting the Waugh. Case and declarmg it overruled. "We are of opinion that the Lambuth and the
Robinson cases proceeded upon the right principles and are in
conflict with the Waugh case, and that the Waugh case is in conflict with the very great weight of authority As to the matter
of original jurisdiction (from which the above mentioned cloudiness came) in such proceedings, we now believe it should be, and

it is overruled.'

57

In State ex rel. Mackintosh v. Rossman5" defendant was disbarred
as a practicing attorney under a statute 59 which defined barratry,
made certain acts criminal, and provided that an attorney violatmg the act should be disbarred. The court pointed out that "From
5 Wash. 329, 31 Pac. 876 (1892).
Ibid, 332.
18 Wash. 478, 51 Pac. 1071 (1898).
Ibid, 480.
432 Wash. 50, 72 Pac. 710 (1903).
48 Wash. 153, 92 Pac. 929 (1907).
102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 1152 (1918).
'In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 480, 172 Pac. 1152.
S53 Wash. 1, 101 Pac. 357 (1909).
"Laws 1903, p. 68.
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the earliest times, one of the penalities for this offense when committed by an attorney has been disbarment. Weeks, Attorneys (2d
ed.) see. 86, 3 Am. & Eng. Ency Law (2d ed.), p. 681." '60 And
as to the legislative action in regard to the matter the court stated
"While it is true that the practice of law is a lawful
occupation in itself, it is not a natural right or a right
granted by the constitution. It is a privilege granted by
the state and may be surrounded with whatever restrictions the legislature may in reason prescribe. * * '
"We think the act is a legitimate exercise of legislative
power. "I6"
Here the Washington court recognized the validity of reasonable
legislative regulation that was an exercise of the police power of
the legislature.
In re Bruen 2 is not only a leading case in this state, but is recognized in many other jurisdictions as an authority on the inherent
power of the courts over the bar. In this disbarment proceeding
the validity of a statute" giving to the board of bar examiners
certain powers was attacked on constitutional grounds, and, because of the strongly reasoned opinion, the case clearly stands as
authority for the general inherent power of the court over the bar
-both as to admission and discipline.
Acting in pursuance of the statute, the board of bar examiners
had tried Bruen on charges involving moral turpitude, found the
charges true, concluded that his right to practice law had been
forfeited, that he should be disbarred, and his name stricken from
the roll of attorneys of the Supreme Court and of the State of
Washington, and it made an order to that effect. Bruen filed a
petition to review the findings, contending that the statute involved was unconstitutional as an encroachment upon the judicial powers conferred by the constitution on the courts. The court
again set forth in certain language the inherent power of the court
"The inherent power of the court is the power to protect itself, the power to administer justice whether any
previous form of remedy had been granted or not, the
power to promulgate rules for its practice, and the power
to provide process where none exists. It ss true that the
judicial power of this court was created by the constituton, but upon coming snto being under. the constitutwn,
this court came into being with 'nherent powers. Among
the 'nherent powers is the power to admit to practce, and
0053 Wash. 1, 4, 101 Pac. 357.
11Ibid, 3.
2Note 56, supra.
3 Laws of 1917, ch. 115, p. 421.

ADMITTANCE TO THE BAR
necessarily therefrom the power to disbarfrom practice,
attorneys at law."6' 4 (Italics inserted.)
The court stated the qualified nature of the legislative power"The cases are fairly uniform upon the proposition
that admitting to practice, suspending, and disbarringare
judicial functions. The legislative power, in the interest
of uniformity of standardand to remedy and prevent msschiefs in the professwn, may regulate and restrict this
power, but cannot take it away. It may provide machinery
for the administration of the regulation provided by the
legislature, as in carrying into effect such regulations
some agency is necessary In this instance it has provided
the machinery and agency of the state board of law exam-

iners. 2 2 5 (Italics inserted).

And the statute involved having granted to the board powers that
partook of the nature of legislative, administrative or executive
and judicial, the court held unconstitutional that part of the statute
which it deemed to be an encroachment on the inherent power of
the court to admit and disbar-"the board is not a court and
cannot exercise the functions of a court except the limited function
of passing upon evidence received by them and reporting it. They
can make no order striking the name of an attorney from the rolls
or disbarring him from practice." 6 6 The rest of the statute was
sustained.
In 1922 In re Ellis8 7 was decided by the court. Ellis sought admission to the bar, as a matter of right, without examination by
the board of bar examiners, on the ground that he was a graduate
of the Umversity of Washington law school with a diploma evidencing such fact, and so, under the statute,"' entitled to admission
without examination. The court recognized the board of bar examiners as an "arm of the court," but, too, that ultimate determination of questions of admission rested with the court.
"While the question of the admission of an attorney to
practice law in this state is one to be determined ultimately by this court, the proceedings looking to the deterination of an applicant's qualifications for admission
are, in the first instance, had before the state board of law
examiners, which board, under our statutes, is an arm of
the court created to aid the court in determining questions
incident to the admission and disciplining of attorneys.
It is upon the record of proceedings had before, and the
recommendation of, that board, and any challenge that
may be made to such recommendation, that the question
102 Wash. 472, 476, 172 Pac. 1152.

e5 bid, 477.

Ibid, 479.
81118 Wash. 484, 203 Pac. 957 (1922).
"' Laws of 1921, ch. 126, p. 407.
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of whether or not the applicant shall be admitted is determined by the court." 6 9
The disbarment proceeding case of In re Olson" held that the
Washington court could, and would in a proper case, act mdependent of or notwithstanding legislative provisions. After hearings on the complaints the state board of bar examiners recommended that the charges against Olson be dismissed. Upon objections and exceptions by the Seattle Bar Association, the matter
was heard before the Supreme Court en bane. Counsel for Olson
argued that "no objections or exceptions could be presented to this
court from the findings and recommendations of the board of bar
examiners by the state or on its behalf, on the ground that the statute * * -makes no provision for such procedure." In reply to this
argument the court stated
"But under the inherent power of this court to admit,
suspend or disbar attorneys at law, notwithstanding the
statute gives the right as a matter of course only to the
person whose license has been annulled or revoked to
object to and have a review of the same, we have felt
obliged, in a matter of such importance to the bar and the
public, to consider that we may, at our own option, examsne into the charges against an attorney proceeded against
before the state board of bar examiners, even though his
license has not been recommended to be revoked or annulled by the board. ' * * but after examining the record
we are unable to arrive at any conclusion differing from
that of the state board of law examiners." 71 (Italics inserted.)
If the judiciary should decide that higher qualifications than
those established by the legislature should be requisite to adussion to the bar, it could rule possession of those higher qualifications to be prerequisite to admission. Reasonable police regulations
of admission and discipline it should and does recognize. But the
existence of legislative qualifications should not and does not preclude the judiciary from establishing and requiring compliance
with higher qualifieations.
Examination of the cases on the inherent power of the judiciary
over admission to the bar reveals authoritative basis, both generally and in Washington, for the statements made at the outset of
this article It is proper to look to the courts for a necessary raising
of standards of admission. It is constitutional for the courts to
.LE.J KENNARD CHEA
raise those standards.
61118 Wash. 484, 485, 203 Pac. 957.
70116 Wash. 186, 198 Pac. 742 (1921).
"I Ibid, 189.
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